‘Star Wars’ Is Dead, Deserves Unceremonious Burial

Signs of morbidity in the Strategic Defense Initiative are now evident, even as the Reagan Administration attempts another multibillion-dollar resuscitation in the 1988 budget request.

Two reckless gambits--attempts for a quick deployment of a crude “Star Wars” system and a “reinterpretation” of the constricting 1972 anti-ballistic-missile treaty--have apparently failed. Now the program’s mortal wounds, some of which are self-inflicted, are so debilitating that neither large cash rescues nor illicit haste will save it. Instead, the nation should start making plans for SDI’s burial.

How can the death of Star Wars be so confidently predicted? For four years SDI has been propelled by three forces: a glossy optimism about technological progress, an intentional equivocation over the goals of the program, and congressional pliancy. All three are dissipating rapidly.

Although SDI managers routinely make claims of “world-class breakthroughs” in missile-defense research, scientists inside and outside the government remain skeptical. A Senate staff study last year disclosed deep disenchantment with SDI among rank-and-file researchers in the project. Last fall a detailed survey of the National Academy of Sciences--members in relevant disciplines such as physics, mathematics and engineering--found that 78% had calculated the prospects of SDI being made survivable and cost-effective to be “poor” or “very poor,” and 98% said that SDI could not protect the U.S. population.

Such skepticism is rooted in the principal discovery of recent research--how difficult the Star Wars task really is. Four areas have emerged as especially daunting: making the space armada invulnerable to attack, compensating for cheap innovations in Soviet missilery, managing thousands of multifunctional satellites and coordinating the defense with offensive nuclear forces under the stress of warfare, and writing flawless computer software to replace human decision-making. These are intrinsic weaknesses, and are fundamentally insoluble.

The second force that has driven SDI’s popularity was the President’s wish for the system to protect the population. Defense experts knew that, at best, a space-based defense might protect some military targets, and SDI officials quietly spoke of enhanced deterrence as a prime goal. This contradiction has often been noted, but the recent attempt by the Pentagon to sell a “thin” defense that allegedly could be deployed in the early 1990s has again undermined the original concept of a comprehensive population defense. Early this month it was reported that an assistant secretary of state, giving his department’s position on SDI deployment in a letter to the Senate, had debunked early deployment, saying that progress in technology did not warrant such a step.

The third engine of SDI, congressional acquiescence, has been stalled by two factors: the failed summit meeting at Reykjavik last October and the attempt to reinterpret the anti-ballistic-missile treaty. The high cost of the program has long troubled many on Capitol Hill, but its value as a bargaining chip gained their votes. Reykjavik has vanquished that support. President Reagan’s failure to trade the feeble SDI dream for immediate deep reductions in nuclear arsenals proved that Star Wars was not negotiable. That may be agreeable to right-wing hard-liners, but it woke up pragmatic legislators.

The Administration’s transparent attempt to “reinterpret” the ABM treaty--to make space tests of Star Wars components legal--has angered some of Reagan’s erstwhile supporters. Conservative Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) called the gambit “a blatant misrepresentation” of the treaty’s provisions, and issued a stinging report rebutting the State Department, which had made the legal case for the reinterpretation.

The Administration has backed off, but major damage has been done.

The rush to deploy a system and the treaty imbroglio are signs of desperation. Star Wars enthusiasts know that SDI will not survive the Reagan presidency. As a result, they believe that a showdown right now is the program’s only chance. But this is a gamble that now looks like a loser.

The Iran- contra affair might contribute to the demise of Star Wars as well. It was, after all, Reagan’s resilient optimism and sense of executive omnipotence--qualities now in disrepair--that gave SDI its greatest boost. The scandal also underscores the predominance of the military and its technology in current foreign policy-making, of which SDI is the case in spades.

If Reagan clings to SDI and declines a trade for deep cuts in strategic weapons, the program will die a slow but certain death--unable to meet its myriad technical demands, devoid of a strategic mission, starved for congressional and public support. It will then devolve to a future President, Republican or Democrat, to give it the unceremonious burial that it deserves.